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TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
I. INTRODUCTION
This essay honors my dear friend of half a century, Burns Weston. In it, I
take a fresh look at the backdrop and structure of toleration and religious
freedom in the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and in the American Constitu-
tion, with special focus on a recent unanimous Supreme Court decision of
first impression. That important decision protects inner church freedoms in
ecclesiastical employment, the so-called "ministerial exception" to federal and
state employment discrimination laws.1
"Of all the great world religions past and present," writes the noted histo-
rian Perez Zagorin, "Christianity has been by far the most intolerant."2 Vio-
lence and the wars of religion before and after the Protestant Reformation
and Catholic Counter-Reformation, in particular, exhausted Europe. The
Peace of Westphalia ended the brutal Thirty Years' War in Europe (Spain
and France remained at war until the Treaty of the Pyrenees of 1659). Euro-
peans and Americans often congratulate themselves on the rise of religious
toleration afterwards. 3 This story may be flawed, for sectarian violence actu-
ally increased inside states from 1550 to 1750.4
The Peace of Westphalia applied basic terms of an earlier religious
agreement, the Peace of Augsburg of 1555, to all the major European powers:
As before, the religion of the ruler was to be the established
religion of the territory. Within each territory, however, the
non-established religious confessions whether Protestant or
Roman Catholic, were given the right to assemble and wor-
ship as well as the right to educate their children in their own
faith. Thus a principle of religious toleration was established
between Lutherans, Calvinists, and Roman Catholics . . .
[and] the principle of royal supremacy over both church and
state . . . was reaffirmed but with certain limitations for the
benefit of non-established churches. At the same time, the
new constitutional principle of limited religious toleration be-
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, No. 10-553 (Jan. 11, 2012),
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/llpdf/10-553.pdf.
2 PEREZ ZAGORIN, HOW THE IDEA OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION CAME TO THE WEST 1 (2003).
3 BENJAMIN J. KAPLAN, DIVIDED BY FAITH: RELIGIOUS CONFLICT AND THE PRACTICE OF
TOLERATION IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 2-7 (2007). Kaplan suggests "the possibility of other
options." Id. at 358.
4 Id. at 336-43.
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came a foundation of a new concept of international law based
on state sovereignty.5
My essay focuses on the historical background and structure for this new
international order with its little-understood provisions for religious tolera-
tion and freedom. The Westphalian system of sovereign states spread widely
after ending the Christian wars in Europe, beginning with the American Dec-
laration of Independence. I ask whether there is any link between provisions
for free exercise of religion in the Treaty and the Religion Clauses of the
American Constitution and compare them structurally. The roots of religious
tolerance worked out in the structure and practice of the Peace of Westphalia
might have special relevance within the global community today, when ubiq-
uitous tensions between liberty of conscience, secular ideology, and religion
are faced by most sovereign states, certainly in the United States.
II. HOSANNA-TABOR EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH AND SCHOOL V.
EEOC
In early 2012, a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court decided Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC.6 It is a narrow decision,
but one that takes us squarely into old struggles between church and state:
who defines and appoints the clergy and who governs the church?
For the first time, the Supreme Court recognized a "ministerial excep-
tion" to bar a lawsuit brought against a church by a teacher under neutral
federal and state employment discrimination statutes of general applicabil-
ity. Her church claimed exemption from suit because some of her work quali-
fied as ministerial. The Court agreed. The church's religious freedom includ-
ed hiring people to serve its mission, and she qualified as a minister. "The
church must be free to choose those who will guide it on its way."7
Chief Justice Roberts' opinion traces the historical development of the
Constitution's Religion Clauses and their importance to the new nation
adopting them: "the Establishment Clause prevents the Government from
appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfer-
ing with the freedom of religious groups to select their own," he writes. 8 The
opinion thus seeks to reconcile a tension he notes between the Establishment
and the Free Exercise Clauses. One way to describe this tension is: an ex-
emption created by courts or by law to an otherwise valid neutral law of gen-
eral applicability that incidentally burdens the free exercise of religion is
5 HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II: THE IMPACT OF THE PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS
ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 61-62 (2003) [hereinafter BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II].
6 Hosanna-Tabor, No. 10-553.
7 Id. at 22.
8 Id. at 9.
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state action that, in effect, creates an establishment of religion by preferen-
tial treatment. There is a vast literature on every aspect of this tension, made
even more anomalous by the incorporation of both Religion Clauses as
against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Commentators have
long considered religious clause jurisprudence, especially the jurisprudence of
the Establishment Clause, to be in a complete muddle. 9
The narrow but unanimous opinion signals a remarkable attempt to unify
the two clauses, referring to them throughout as the "Religion Clauses,"
which the Court has often done previously for convenience. Chief Justice
Roberts uses the phrase to identify a kind of separate sphere or category of
church freedom from state interference with ecclesiastical appointments and
internal governing practices. This kind of autonomy of church ecclesiastical
power is not new. Before the Papal Revolution of the 11th Century, the feudal
Christian kings made many ecclesiastical appointments as part of adminis-
tering their feudal fiefs that scarcely distinguished secular from religious
power. 10 In The King's Two Bodies, Ernst Kantorowicz explains:
What matters here is only the persona mixta in the religio-
political sphere where it was represented chiefly by bishop
and king, and where the "mixture" referred to the blending of
spiritual and secular powers and capacities united in one per-
son. Dual capacity in this sense was a feature customary and
rather common with the clergy during the feudal age when
bishops were not only princes of the Church but also feudato-
ries of kings. 1 '
As discussed below, Pope Gregory VII considered these ecclesiastical ap-
pointments as outside a king's temporal powers. The reforms included a new
corporate, hierarchical structure that asserted papal sovereignty over mat-
ters "spiritual" and included appointments of clergy and investitures of
kings. 12 This Papal Revolution purified the Church, enforcing spiritual juris-
diction by canon law found in Gratian's decretals from the newly discovered
Corpus Juris Civilis of Justinian in Bologna.' 3
Steven G. Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment Clause, 5 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 1, 4 (2006)
("[C]onstitutional scholars of every stripe seem to agree ... that the Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence is an incoherent mess.").
10 JOSEPH R. STRAYER, ON THE MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF THE MODERN STATE 20-21 (1973) (noting
that kings "appointed abbots, bishops, and often popes; they even intervened (as Charlemagne
had) in matters of doctrine").
11 ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, THE KING'S Two BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIAEVAL POLITICAL
THEOLOGY 43 (1997).
12 NORMAN F. CANTOR, THE CIVILIZATION OF THE MIDDLE AGES 260 (1993).
13 STRAYER, supra note 10, at 21-22. See generally HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION:
724 [Vol. 21:721
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The Protestant Reformation reversed papal hierarchical control over the
secular power, clawing back much spiritual authority to the jurisdiction of
secular rulers. 14 Harold Berman explains:
[P]rotestantism transferred spiritual authority and spiritual
responsibilities to the secular lawmakers of the various prin-
cipalities and nation-states, whose supreme authorities now
embraced all the jurisdictions that had previously been au-
tonomous. Secular law may thus be said to have been spiritu-
alized at the same time that it became nationalized . . . .
[S]ecularism itself became secularized and the common legal
heritage of the West dissolved into intense nationalisms. 15
The Roberts opinion does not go into the Papal Revolution, relying mainly
on early historical precedents from England: one from the Magna Carta of
1215, in which King John promises free election of clergy of the English
Church; and another for freedom of the Anglican Church under King Henry
VIII.16 The first recognizes the feudal tension with papal authority over in-
ternal church affairs. The second flows from the Protestant Reformation,
where the English king also took back ecclesiastical matters as head of the
Anglican Church and appointed or dismissed ministers previously appointed
or controlled by Rome. There would be no ministerial exceptions under Henry
VIII. He did not tolerate churches that appointed Catholic priests or Calvin-
ist ministers in his realm outside his authority as head of the Anglican
Church. Catholics, Puritans, and other Protestants in England were coerced
either to follow the doctrines and practices of the Anglican Church or to leave
the country. Some left and ended up in Holland or America. English tolera-
tion of dissident religions took bloody civil wars to work through.
Before the American Revolution, some colonies were required to follow
the established religion of the English king. After the Revolution, the newly
independent American states could establish or disestablish religion on their
own, as Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance demonstrates, with popular
sovereignty now posing a different problem in tolerating minority religions.
In the new Constitution, however, the federal government was disabled from
establishing a national religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The
THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983) [hereinafter BERMAN, LAW AND
REVOLUTION]; DIARMAID MACCULLOCH, CHRISTIANITY: THE FIRST THREE THOUSAND YEARS 377
(2009).
14 BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II, supra note 5, at 61-62.
15 Id. at ix-x.
16 "The Act of Supremacy of 1534, 26 Hen. 8, ch. 1, made the English monarch the supreme head
of the Church, and the Act in Restraint of Annates, 25 Hen. 8, ch. 20, passed that same year,
gave him the authority to appoint the Church's high officials." Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, No. 10-553, slip op. at 7 (Jan. 11, 2012); see also ZAGORIN,
supra note 2, at 188-239.
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two Religion Clauses of the First Amendment further disabled the national
government from interfering with any state religious establishment, though
this is controversial.
The framers of the American Constitution wanted to protect the liberty of
conscience by prohibiting laws imposing a national religion by coercion or
taxation. Interestingly enough, the phrases guaranteeing "the free Exercise of
their Religion" and "the Liberty of the Exercise of Religion" appear in the
Treaty of Miinster (one of the two Westphalian treaties) a century and a half
before they show up in the First Amendment. We do not know if there is any
connection.
Chief Justice Roberts applied the two Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment as defenses to suits under both federal and state employment
law, the latter presumably through the Fourteenth Amendment. He never
mentioned incorporation-except implicitly-by relying on Supreme Court
cases from the mid-20th Century that prohibit states from interfering with
the freedom of religious groups to decide disputes over ownership of church
property through their internal process: "[I]t is impermissible for the gov-
ernment to contradict a church's determination of who can act as its minis-
ters."17 The famous Kedroff case in 1952 protected the Russian Orthodox
Church's highest ecclesiastical authority from a New York law's interference
with its decision on which congregation would have use of the Saint Nicholas
Cathedral. 18 With Hosanna-Tabor, the Court for the first time extended that
inner church freedom to appointing ministers as well.
The result is a unified doctrine at all levels of government without any
attempt at explaining anomalies of incorporating the Establishment Clause
that have been pointed out by many scholars, such as Akhil Amar 1 9 and Mi-
chael McConnell. 20 In effect, the Court constructs a single category or new
sphere of church immunity to insulate ecclesiastical governance, appoint-
ments, and perhaps internal employment from government social employ-
ment policy or non-discrimination laws at every level. 21 In structure, the re-
sult restores part of the exclusive church control of ecclesiastical appoint-
17 Hosanna-Tabor, No. 10-553, slip op. at 10.
1s Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116
(1952).
19 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 34 (1998).
20 See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1417 (1990).
21 See Douglas Laycock, Towards A General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church
Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981).
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ments and inner governance, which the medieval church took away from the
Christian feudal kings in the 12th Century. 22
The Chief Justice does not delve into the wars of religion that led to in-
creased religious freedom for individuals and churches after the Protestant
Reformation. When the former English colonies declared their sovereign in-
dependence in 1776, however, they did so within an international framework
of the new Westphalian system of sovereign territorial nation-states with
provisions for free exercise of religion by dissidents in the territory of an es-
tablished state religion.
III. CHRISTIAN INTOLERANCE: ROME TO THE BREAK-UP OF CHRISTENDOM
I would now like to step back for a broad review of religious intolerance in
church and state relations from ancient Rome to Christendom's wars of reli-
gion after its break-up in the Protestant Reformation of early modern Eu-
rope. We need this review to explain a paradox. How could religious freedom
and toleration emerge from the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, which removed
the Christian religion from political power of a sovereign state, while at the
same time allowing establishment of a Christian church as the state religion?
A. Intolerance and Coercion in Christian Rome
"Should we tolerate the intolerant?"22 Religious sects in countries like
France or the United States cannot practice intolerance to harass or perse-
cute deviants or heretics in their midst, but "they are free to excommunicate
or ostracize" them and
equally free to believe and say that such people will be
damned forever or denied a place in the world to come-or
that any other group of their fellow citizens are living a life
that God rejects or that is utterly incompatible with human
flourishing. Indeed, many of the Protestant sectarians for
whom the modern regime of toleration was first designed, and
who made it work, believed and said just such things.24
The problem, according to Michael Walzer, is that "within the idea of re-
ligious toleration itself, virtually all the tolerated religions aim to restrict in-
22 See Steven D. Smith, Freedom of Religion or Freedom of the Church? (Univ. of San Diego Sch.
of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 11-061, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1911412; BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II, supra note 5, at 50-51,
103-06.
23 MICHAEL WALZER, ON TOLERATION 80 (1997) (explaining that tolerance is attitude and
toleration is practice).
24 Id. at 81.
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dividual freedom .. . . Most religions are organized to control behavior."25 In
the United States, people are prepared to tolerate minority religions and,
thus, defend religious liberty, but many
have no tolerance for personal liberty outside the house of
worship. If sectarian communities aim to control the behavior
of their own people, the more extreme members of religious
majorities aim to control everyone's behavior-in the name of
a supposedly common (Judeo-Christian, say) tradition, of
"family values," or of their own certainties about what is right
and wrong.26
And they do not hesitate to ask the state for help. To refuse this help, they
claim, denies them the right of the free exercise of their own religion. 27
Original Christianity, initially the victim of religious intolerance and per-
secution, preached and practiced unilateral human love, but would not toler-
ate Roman paganism. 28 After Constantine converted to Christianity and le-
galized it, the final merger of Rome and Christianity under Theodosius made
punishment possible for both heresy and blasphemy. First, the Church would
anathematize the offenders. They were then turned over to the Roman state
for punishment, forfeiting property and civil rightS29 and sometimes life it-
self. The powerful Augustine, bishop of Hippo, advocated systematic persecu-
tion of heretics, leading the way to the "medieval mentality and to the Inqui-
sition," which continued and refined the practice.30
Augustine waged "long theological combat with three formidable heresies,
Manichaeanism, Pelagianism, and Donatism." 31 He justified coercion against
heretics to enforce religious truth, especially against the Donatists, who
viewed Christianity's alliance with Rome "as a renunciation of Christ in favor
of Caesar."32 Church theology fused the empire to an expanding neo-Platonic
25 Id. at 71.
26 Id. at 70.
27 See infra note 170 (discussing Catholic bishops claiming exemption from a general health
insurance regulation for employees requiring birth control benefits). For contemporary
discussion, see Timothy Egan, Theocracy and Its Discontents, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 23, 2012,
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/23/theocracy-and-its-discontents/?refopinion.
28 CARLTON J. H. HAYES, 1 A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE 197 (rev. ed.
1932).
29 LEONARD W. LEVY, BLASPHEMY: VERBAL OFFENSE AGAINST THE SACRED, FROM MOSES TO
SALMAN RUSHDIE 44-57 (1993) [hereinafter LEVY, BLASPHEMY].
30 Id. at 46.
31 ZAGORIN, supra note 2, at 26.
32 Id. at 27.
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human society in the body of Christ, unified by ritual and Truth.
33 Because it
took both church and state to put down heresies, 34 the one "true" Catholic
religion, when mixed with coercive state power, would not so easily separate.
Augustine's discovery of "self' and conscience, as Peter Brown suggests, also
allowed the use of fear of coercion to suppress heresy.
35
Sometime after Rome's fall, 36 the prophet Mohammed brought forth a
new religion challenging the divinity of Jesus. The Christian Eastern Empire
checked the invasion of Islam into Europe from the east. Moving across North
Africa, Islamic armies crossed Iberia and entered into what is now France
from the west around the northern Pyrenees. The Frankish king, Charles
Martel, stopped the Muslims at the Battle of Poitier. What remained of the
Western Empire now had time to negotiate with the barbaric Germanic chief-
tains. According to historian Judith Herrin, the resulting bargains prompted
Martel and others to assimilate Christianity. 37 The rise of feudalism under
Christian kings and Western Emperor Charlemagne eased the formation of
Christendom, a polity that allowed neither Church nor feudal kings to domi-
nate entirely.38 This contrasted with singular imperial dominance in the
Christian East and in Islam. Herrin's scholarship places an aggressive Islam
near the center of the question of why the separation of church and state
arose in the West from these bargains, but not in Byzantium nor in Arab, Ot-
toman, or Persian Islam. 39
B. The Papal Revolution
Tension between Christian kings and the Church over ecclesiastical mat-
ters prevented universal political union of Western Christendom, unlike in
the East. Many Christian kings took upon themselves sacred missions, as in
33 See PETER BROWN, AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO: A BIOGRAPHY 213-21 (rev. ed. 2000).
3 CHARLES FREEMAN, THE CLOSING OF THE WESTERN MIND: THE RISE OF FAITH AND THE FALL OF
REASON 308-09 (2005) (stating that the diversity of sources of Christian doctrine made any kind
of coherent "truth" difficult to sustain, and only the emperors could maintain order).
35 BROWN, supra note 33, at 503.
36 The fall of Rome was abrupt and sometimes blamed on Christianity and monasticism,
although the economic well-being of its taxpayers and economic conditions surrounding the
Germanic invasions are the more cited causes today. BRYAN WARD-PERKINS, THE FALL OF ROME
AND THE END OF CIVILIZATION 40-41 (2005). "The Roman state has been reduced to a miserable
condition ... and throughout the world the unspeakable heresy of the Arians, that has become so
embedded amongst the barbarian peoples, displaces the name of the Catholic church." Id. at 31
(quoting a Chronicler of 452 before the formal end of Rome came in 476).
37 See JUDITH HERRIN, THE FORMATION OF CHRISTENDOM 303-06 (1987).
38 Id. at 356-60, 454-57, 480.
39 Id. at 479-80.
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the Crusades, and controlled bishops and local clergy with grants of land in
exchange for feudal allegiance. The reforms of Pope Gregory VII, beginning in
the 11th Century, removed ecclesiastical appointments of Church hierarchy
from the kings to the pope as head of a divine hierarchy, the sole Vicar of
Christ, patterned after Roman hierarchy.40 These reforms enforced Christian
purity by reclaiming spiritual matters from the secular world, taking back
power to appoint bishops, insisting upon celibacy among the priests and cler-
gy (whose worldly marriages profaned the faith), and asserting the right of
investiture of kings.4 1 Historian Norman Cantor refers to these reforms as
the Gregorian World Revolution. 42
All Christian rulers were now subject to the spiritual authority of the
pope, backed by his power of excommunication.43 Radical purification and
control required the development and written codification of a separate canon
law, drawn from the Roman civil codes, whose importance to the Western
legal tradition has been under-appreciated. This separation of spheres of ju-
risdiction between spiritual domination by the pope and temporal domain of
the kings introduced a check on arbitrary state power from principles of
Catholic natural law.44 Moreover, canon law controlled matters such as mar-
riage, inheritance, heresy, and blasphemy.45 Most people held the belief that
political unity required religious unity.46 Disruptions in Christian unity were
handled at the most local level possible under canon law and medieval prac-
tices of subsidiarity.4 7 There were many violent popular rebellions against
authorities as a result of the Papal Revolution. The political agenda of the
40 CANTOR, supra note 12, at 258.
41 BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, supra note 13, at 85-119; CANTOR, supra note 12, at 258-76
(claiming papal power to depose emperors and kings and creating a new world order for
Christian society "founded on the principle that papal authority alone was universal and
plenary, while all other powers in the world, whether emperors, kings or bishops, were particular
and dependent").
42 CANTOR, supra note 12, at 243-76.
43 Ambrose used the threat of excommunication to subjugate the emperor Theodosius in the 4th
Century in the assault on paganism when the Nicene creed was adopted as the only truth: "This
supremacy was embedded in western theology in the works of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas
and . . . was used for the excommunication of the Holy Roman emperor Henry IV by pope
Gregory VII in the 1070s." CHARLES FREEMAN, A NEW HISTORY OF EARLY CHRISTIANITY 259
(2009).
4 See BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, supra note 13, at 44-45, 85-86.
46 Id.
46 HAYES, supra note 28, at 201.
17 Paola G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law,
97 AM. J. INT'L L. 38 (2003) (tracing the subsidiary principle from medieval thought into the
Reformation and today's secular human rights dilemmas of intervention and resolution).
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papal party called for "the freedom of the church" or liberating "the clergy
from imperial, royal, and feudal domination and their unification under papal
authority."48
C. Heresies and Treason in Medieval Christianity
The religious wars that disturbed the general security of all in Western
Europe after the Protestant Reformation did not just spring from Martin Lu-
ther's schism or Henry VIII's revolt from papal authority and the Puritan
Revolution in England. They had taken a long time coming.49 Heresies in
Christendom, magnified by devastating plagues, accumulated gradually from
Abelard of the 11th Century, William of Ockham's nominalism, 50 re-
introduction of science from Aristotle's work, the medieval idea of the indi-
vidual conscience, peasants' revolts against authority, subversive art, and
finally Luther's protests against selling indulgences in the 16th Century as
"works" to earn salvation (such as raising money to rebuild St. Peter's Basili-
ca in Rome).5 1 The Spanish monarchs undertook a concerted effort of expel-
ling Jews from Spain (later Muslims) to centralize their rule, using the Span-
ish Inquisition, which adopted the most exquisite methods of torture, in their
service.
In 1518, friends of Luther translated his 95 Theses from Latin into Ger-
man. They were printed and widely circulated. The protest was one of the
first in history to be aided by the printing press, and copies quickly spread
throughout Germany and the rest of Europe. Pope Leo X excommunicated
Luther on January 3, 1521, for heresy. Placed under jurisdiction of the secu-
lar power for enforcement at the Diet of Worms, Luther stood his ground, re-
fusing to go against his own religious conscience under threat of coercion:
Unless I am convinced by the testimony of the Scriptures or
by clear reason (for I do not trust either in the pope or in
councils alone, since it is well known that they have often
erred and contradicted themselves), I am bound by the Scrip-
tures I have quoted and my conscience is captive to the Word
of God. I cannot and will not recant anything, since it is nei-
ther safe nor right to go against conscience. May God help me.
Amen.52
48 BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, supra note 13, at 103-04.
4 See CANTOR supra note 12, at 480-504.
50 Id. at 532-35.
51 On selling indulgences, see DIARMAID MACCULLOCH, THE REFORMATION 121-125 (2004)
[hereinafter MACCULLOCH, REFORMATION].
52 MARTIN BRECHT, MARTIN LUTHER 1:460 (James L. Schaaf trans., 1985).
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He rejected compulsory confession and accepted secular protection in the
province of a sympathetic Elector of the Holy Roman Empire. After the vio-
lent German Peasants' War of 1524-25, the Reformation took firm hold, de-
spite Luther's call for non-violence. Political rivalry grew among proliferating
Protestant princes within the Empire for control of their own realms. Luther-
ans and Catholics contended first, then intolerant Calvinist rulers and their
sects joined in, but radical sects of Jansenites, Unitarians, Anabaptists, and
others rose up, too. Shockwaves reverberated through the Hapsburg dynasty
and European monarchies alike as whatever medieval unity remained of Lat-
in Christendom came apart.
The religious wars first broke out in the mid-16th Century in Germany
between the Lutheran principalities of the north and the Catholic Holy Ro-
man Empire, which brought in countries in the south, after church properties
and treasure were confiscated by opposing religious parties, often changing
hands on differing pretexts as rulers changed religion. The Diet of Augsburg
and later the Peace of Augsburg of 1555 settled these first Christian wars by
agreement under the principle cuius regio eius religio-the religion of the
ruler shall be the religion of the realm.
As the 16th Century came to a close, the Spanish Inquisition was in full
sway. Spain and the Austrian Hapsburgs were poised to achieve political
dominance over France and the diverse cities and states of continental Eu-
rope, further checking the Holy Roman Empire, the last remnant of Chris-
tendom.53 They would contend with Islam (the Ottoman Empire had con-
quered most of the Balkans in central Europe and had nearly taken Vienna),
with Muscovy, with China, and with the Mughals of Southeast Asia to extend
power within the vast Euro-Asian land mass. 54 The Hapsburg monarchs,
whose dynastic powers were sustained by personal dominions of inheritance
and marriage, received homage from a "patchwork pattern of dominions in
which the estates of their component territories retained a separate identity,
as well as substantial control over the making and local enforcement of the
law."55 The Hapsburg Austrian dominions (including Hungary and Bohemia),
for example, were contiguous, but they were not a "state" as we know it today
or even in the classical sense. The Holy Roman Empire, a loose assemblage of
German princes whose emperor (often a Hapsburg) was chosen by seven
5 CHARLES W. INGRAO, THE HABSBURG MONARCHY 1618-1815, 4-6, 52 (1994).
m See PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS 16-30 (1987). The failure of
Spain and the Hapsburgs strengthened a decentralized rivalry among the power centers of
Europe that crystallized into the "European miracle" formative of the nation-state system and
the explosion of science, trade, exploration, and economic growth.
55 INGRAO, supra note 53, at 6.
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Electors, similarly was not a "state."5 6 But both had strong elements of quasi-
federal hierarchical control over Christian polities.
D. The End of Unity in Christendom: Protestant Reformation and
Fragmentation
Starting with Clovis, the Venerable Bede, and the monasteries, then with
Charlemagne's Holy Roman Empire, the Crusades, and the Papal Revolution,
Christendom achieved balance between temporal and spiritual powers. It fi-
nally had put down the most dangerous heresies to become the unifying cul-
ture that sustained the peoples of the Western Roman Empire after it was
formally dismantled in 476. In his monumental history of the Reformation,
Diarmaid MacCulloch noted:
During the sixteenth century this western society, previously
unified by the pope's symbolic leadership and by possession of
that common Latin culture, was torn apart by deep disagree-
ments about how human beings should exercise the power of
God in the world, arguments even about what it was to be
human. It was a process of extreme physical and mental vio-
lence.5 7
The Protestant Reformation became a third great division made up of
dissident Christian beliefs, which fragmented further between Lutherans and
Calvinists (Anglicans in Britain) and spawned radical sects of Mennonites,
Anabaptists, Unitarians, Huguenots, and others. Luther and dissidents of the
Reformation encouraged individual interpretations of Biblical texts available
from the printing press, offering grace or salvation directly from God without
interposition by priests or hierarchy. The apostolic authority of Christendom,
already suffering, came under multiple direct assaults. Subjective interpreta-
tions and personal spiritual experiences undermined the entire hierarchical
medieval order, in which written texts from direct apostolic succession and
canon law were under the control of clerics, secular clerks, and academics.
"Schisms, sects, and heresies were inevitable as individuals reinterpreted the
Bible for themselves, whether mystically, literally, allegorically, or rational-
ly."5 8 Lutheranism and Calvinism were more intolerant of dissent from or-
thodoxies of their own, disciplining their own wayward adherents perhaps
more cruelly than the Inquisition did Catholic heretics.
The idea that political unity depended upon religious unity either misled
European princes and monarchs or provided opportunity for the ambitious
56 See HAYES, supra note 28, at 136-219 (providing a good general summary of Christian
fragmentation, intolerance, and the beginning of the Thirty-Year War).
57 MACCULLOCH, REFORMATION, supra note 51, at xix.
58 LEVY, BLASPHEMY, supra note 29, at 58.
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princes intent on coercing their people to conform to one official kind of Chris-
tianity.5 9 The Council of Trent instituted systematic censorship and
strengthened the Inquisition, calling on Catholic princes to enforce its de-
crees.6 0 Luther now urged secular rulers to use force not only against Catho-
lics, but also against Anabaptists and other radical Protestant sects. 61 In Ge-
neva, Calvin would not tolerate Catholics and dissenting Protestants. He sent
Michael Servetus to trial for doctrinal heresies and they burned him alive at
the stake, provoking a major controversy over toleration and killing of here-
tics. 62 Thousands of people were executed as heretics. Similarly, Spanish and
Portuguese monarchs, even Italian princes, employed all means to get rid of
religious dissent and compelled their subjects to conform to a rigid Catholi-
cism, with great success when Protestantism failed to take root there.
Many victims of the Inquisition in Spain were Moriscos (Muslim Moors
who were given the choice of exile or baptism) and Marranos or Conversos
(Jews who assimilated as New Christians by choice) suspected of relapsing
into Judaism to avoid expulsion in the late 15th Century. Sometimes "they
were professed Catholics who were thought to be too mystical or too 'liberal'
or too tolerant. Such a famous Catholic as Ignatius Loyola, the founder of the
Jesuits, was twice imprisoned by the Inquisition."63 Benzion Netanyahu mar-
shals impressive evidence to show that the Inquisition in Spain was driven
not by religious orthodoxy of the Church but by the political ambition of the
Christian Spanish monarchs, who used it to control the great Jewish families
who were now New Christians. 64 Their enhanced stature and influence in
business and government had
aroused a new wave of hatred based on racism more than re-
ligion.... [T]he claim by the Spanish Inquisition around 1500
that the Jewish New Christians (Marranos) were secretly
practicing their old religion was mostly untrue. Most of the
Sefardic Jews became normal Christians . . . and today, one
third of the modern Spanish nobility is descended from Jew-
ish converts.65
59 HAYES, supra note 28, at 201.
6 Id. at 202.
61 Id.
62 ZAGORIN, supra note 2, at 96.
63 HAYES, supra note 28, at 202.
64 See BENZION NETANYAHU, THE ORIGINS OF THE INQUISITION IN FIFTEENTH CENTURY SPAIN 5
(1995) ("[M]ajority's toleration of every minority lessens with the worsening of the majority's
condition, especially when paralleled with steady improvement of the minority's status.").
65 CANTOR, supra note 12, at 372.
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Even in persecuting heretics-heresy was a religious crime-the objective of
intolerance was to enhance political unity using religious belief, in effect to
strengthen the central state's political power. 66
Lutheran kings destroyed Catholicism and suppressed dissent in Scandi-
navia, Finland, and Estonia. In Scotland, Calvinist nobles led by John Knox
deposed the Catholic queen Mary Stuart, seized government, and killed
Catholics. In England, intolerance fluctuated, ending in Anglicanism with
brutal harassment of Catholics and Protestant dissenters. When the Puritans
took power for a time in the 17th Century, they in turn persecuted both
Catholics and Anglicans. In Ireland, "official Protestantism became the elite
sect and Roman Catholicism the popular religion, in a result unique in the
whole Reformation."67 The Ottomans were more tolerant of Christians once
conquered (the conquests were bloody) than the Christians were of each oth-
er. Spain witnessed a similar situation during the Arab conquest of Iberia
beginning in the 8th Century, until the Christian reconquest began to appear
haphazardly in some locations from the north as early as the 11th Century.
"By the early thirteenth century most of Spain was back in Christian hands .
. . The Spanish Jews did not regret this reversal of fortune because their sit-
uation in the previous century of Moslem rule in Sefard (as they called Spain)
was precarious." 68
In France, religious intolerance against the Huguenots by militant
and political Catholics resulted in the massacre of thousands of Huguenots on
St. Bartholomew's day in 1572.69 When Henry IV conciliated with the Edict of
Nantes in 1598, granting a degree of religious freedom to Protestants in
France, it was dictated less by a sense of justice than by political expedien-
cy. 70 In Germany, the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire and a majority of
the electors remained Catholic.7 1 Many princes followed Lutheranism, and
some later converted to Calvinism. While they persecuted the dissident mi-
norities within their realms, the people invented ways to live and let live. 72
The Hapsburg dynasty remained Catholic, maintaining a balance of power to
preserve dynastic control throughout Europe, especially in Austria and
Spain, thrusting it into conflict with the Protestant princes of the Holy Ro-
man Empire and the emerging states of northern Europe. 73
66 KAPLAN, supra note 3, at 309-312.
6 7 IACCULLOCH, REFORMATION, supra note 51, at 394.
68 CANTOR, supra note 12, at 371.
69 HAYES, supra note 28, at 204.
70 Id. at 205.
71 Id. at 203.
72 KAPLAN, supra note 3, at 127-234.
73 See generally JAMES BRYCE, THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE (5th ed. 1904).
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E. The Peace of Augsburg of 1555
The bitter struggle between the Empire and the princes led to the Peace
of Augsburg of 1555. It perpetuated the myth that political unity required
religious unity, but went in the other direction. The treaty affirmed the right
of each prince to choose to be either Lutheran (not yet recognizing Calvinism)
or Catholic and to compel all his subjects to conform to his religion under the
principle of cuius regio eius religio.74 At first, "every prince was permitted to
enforce either the Catholic or the Lutheran faith in his lands so that subjects
who could not conform must emigrate. This extraordinary compromise saved
the theory of religious unity for each state while destroying it for the Em-
pire."75 Then Calvinism appeared and, in direct contravention to the settle-
ment, began to proselytize with zeal and effectiveness. "'The Calvinist drag-
on,' declared a Lutheran writer, 'is pregnant with all the horrors of Moham-
medanism."'76 The Augsburg settlement had an important rule, the Ecclesias-
tical Reservation, that no "ruling prelate, abbot, bishop or archbishop, might
retain his lands if he should at any time be converted to the Protestant reli-
gion."7 7 The Reservation was not respected by Calvinists, and they were con-
verting as many princes and abbots and bishops as they could. "The libertari-
an movements, the convulsive outbursts of mercantile or peasant insurrec-
tion, terrified those unhappy rulers who were perched between rebellion be-
neath and oppression above . . . . [T]he natural alliance between those who
demanded liberty of conscience and those who demanded political freedom
was broken asunder."7 8
Once political and sectarian dissent broke the unity of Protestant dissent,
the Peace of Augsburg no longer worked. Calvinist princes revolted from their
exclusion, while the Counter-Reformation reinforced the Emperor's right to
enforce Catholicism in his dominions, including Spain and Austria. Forced
conversion or emigration followed, with intolerance spreading more widely
and becoming more vicious to cleanse the realm, not unlike the Balkan wars
in the former Yugoslavia in the late 20th Century. There was no real devo-
tion to reason, to scientific truth, to abstract principles of religious freedom,
or to tolerance for another's beliefs or opinion. All devout Christians attached
to the truth of their own beliefs and the spread of them as dogma were urged
on by their own princes and their armies of mercenaries, who were not loyal
to anyone. Presently, this widespread religious intolerance coextensive with
7" INGRAO, supra note 53, at 27, 50-51.
75 C.V. WEDGWOOD, THE THIRTY YEARS WAR 42 (1939).
76 Id. at 42.
7 Id. at 43.
78 Id.
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political power became the legal rule of the day. The militant Reformed
Protestants were not alone. "Archbishop Abbot of Canterbury eagerly looked
in 1618 for an alliance which would stretch from Scotland to Transylvania, so
'by piece and piece, the kings of the earth that gave their power unto the
Beast shall now tear the whore and make her desolate."'79
The "Defenestration of Prague" (May 23, 1618) caused the revolt in Bo-
hemia to erupt into "one of the longest and most destructive civil and interna-
tional wars in human annals-the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648)."o The
military campaigns, stratagems, and the invasion by Gustavus Adolphus
from Sweden and his enemy Wallenstein with their mercenary armies are
well beyond the scope of this Article, but they were brutal, especially to vil-
lagers and civilian populations.
IV. THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA
The Congress of Westphalia convened after lengthy preparations to bring
the savage Christian wars to a close. It opened December 4, 1644, with 135
delegates. They included theologians, philosophers, and diplomats.8 1 A hun-
dred years of previous attempts had failed to end the religious violence after
the Protestant upheaval. This congress was the first of the great congresses
of the modern era. The plan called for two separate negotiations, although
formalities delayed serious work. At Miinster, the French would treat with
the Holy Roman Empire under mediation of the Papacy and Venice. At Osna-
briick 30 miles away, France and the Empire would treat with Sweden under
mediation of Christian IV of Denmark, thus avoiding the problem of seating
papal nuncios to negotiate with Protestant heretics.
A. A New Political Order of Sovereign States
The resulting Peace of Westphalia marked the beginning of a new politi-
cal order: a system of sovereign territorial nation-states that was emerging in
Europe even before the break-up of Christendom. Leo Gross's classic article
written in 1948 after three hundred years of the new political order remains
still the best summary:
The Peace of Westphalia, for better or worse, marks the end of
an epoch and the opening of another. It represents the majes-
tic portal which leads from the old into the new world. The old
world, we are told, lived in the idea of a Christian common-
7 5MACCULLOCH, REFORMATION, supra note 51, at 494.
80 HAYES, supra note 28, at 203.
81 See generally GEOFFRY PARKER, EUROPE IN CRISIS: 1598-1648 (1979); J. V. POLI ENSK, THE
THIRTY YEARS WAR (Robert Evans trans., 1971); WEDGWOOD, supra note 75; CHARLES WILSON,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE: 1558-1648 (1976).
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wealth, of a world harmoniously ordered and governed in the
spiritual and temporal realms by the Pope and Emperor. This
medieval world was characterized by a hierarchical concep-
tion of the relationship between the existing political entities
on the one hand, and the Emperor on the other. For a long
time preceding the Peace of 1648, however, powerful intellec-
tual, political, and social forces were at work which opposed
and, by opposing them, undermined, both the aspirations and
the remaining realities of the unified control of Pope and Em-
peror. In particular the Reformation and Renaissance, and,
expressive of the rising urge of individualism in politics, na-
tionalism, each in its own field, attacked the supreme author-
ity claimed by the Pope and the Emperor. . . . In the spiritual
field the Treaty of Westphalia was said to be 'a public act of
disregard of the international authority of the Papacy.' In the
political field it marked man's abandonment of the idea of a
hierarchical structure of society and his option for a new sys-
tem characterized by the coexistence of a multiplicity of
states, each sovereign within its territory, equal to one anoth-
er, and free from any external earthly authority.82
The agreements stabilized the borders of European nations and solidified
the emerging system of territorial nation-states under a rough law of nations.
"The shifting of the balance between Church and State was in process in 1618
and might well have completed itself without unnecessary bloodshed. Calvin-
ism . . . was practised by more of the population before than after the war."83
The hidden victim, however, was the Christian religion. It survived but with
deep popular skepticism about the coarseness of religious polemics. 84
In contrast with the power of Spain, Portugal, England, and the United
Provinces, "[i]n the Empire there was no central authority, private wealth
was declining, and the principle of cujus regio ejus religio meant that a man
could have some degree of freedom of conscience without crossing the Atlan-
tic." 85 The war was an "unmitigated catastrophe"8 6 in Germany and equally
82 Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AM. J. INTL L. 28-29 (1948) (citations
omitted).
8 WEDGWOOD, supra note 75, at 520-21.
84 See ELMER A. BELLER, PROPAGANDA IN GERMANY DURING THE THIRTY YEARS WAR (1940)
(reproducing prints made from twenty-four plates to reach all classes, literate and mostly
illiterate, who received satisfaction at broadsides for political effect at an enemy's defeat or an
event such as the Peace of Westphalia with benevolent France and Sweden behind a comic
imperial trinity).
5 WEDGWOOD, supra note 75, at 522.
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so in Europe, though in a different way. "The Peace of Westphalia was like
most peace treaties, a rearrangement of the European map ready for the next
war . . . and the last of the wars of religion merged insensibly into the pseudo-
national wars of the future."87 The Vatican condemned the peace. Extreme
Catholics and Protestants were not satisfied. "[MIen might have grasped the
essential futility of putting the beliefs of the mind to the judgement of the
sword. Instead they rejected religion as an object to fight for and found oth-
ers."88
Territorial arrangements were adjusted to accommodate religions and to
minimize immigrations.89 Protestants remained in the north and Catholics
stayed to the south, thus protecting France from a united Germany. The
practical guaranties that the treaties would be observed were of the highest
importance.90 Citizens or subjects in each state, city, or province were ulti-
mate beneficiaries of the agreement among all the major European states and
provinces.9 1 The treaties settled public and private grievances, confiscations
based on religion and civil wrongs. 92
86 Id. at 525.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 526.
89 See generally id. at 505-26. In summary, the Peace of Westphalia also accomplished the
following territorial arrangements:
1. Switzerland and the United Provinces were formally recognized as independent.
2. Bavaria received Upper Palatinate with an electoral vote in the Imperial Diet.
3. Lower Palatinate electorate was restored to the Empire.
4. Brandenburg was given Eastern Pomerania (which later enabled Prussia under
Bismarck to defeat France).
5. Sweden became one of the Great Powers with Imperial fiefs.
6. German principalities retained their liberties from the Empire.
7. The Emperor was confined to Bohemia and Hungary, in effect transforming the Holy
Roman Empire into the Austro-Hungarian Empire. River outlets passed to Sweden
and the United Provinces.
8. France with the greatest gains took Alsace and extended its frontiers, breaking the
power of the Hapsburgs.
9o See Gross, supra note 82, at 24 (quoting studies by Sir James Headlam-Morley that "no
guarantee was more important or has been more often referred to than that included in the
treaties of Westphalia").
91 Id. (citing C. VAN VOLLENHOVEN, THE LAW OF PEACE 85 (1936)); see also KAPLAN, supra note 3,
at 220.
92 For the many specific treaty settlement provisions of the Treaty of Westphalia in English
translation at the Avalon project from Yale University, see infra note 98.
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The Treaty of Westphalia is a public order obligation: while each inde-
pendent and sovereign state or province might have a single established reli-
gion of the ruler's own choice within its territory (from the Peace of Augs-
burg), these states were obligated to each other to allow certain religious
freedoms for those Christians and their churches who were not of the estab-
lished religion within a state. The practical effect of these treaty provisions
was not so clear in the beginning. Benjamin Kaplan points out "that religious
violence-popular, official, military-continued in many parts of Europe in
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. The age of religious wars
had not yet ended."93
B. "Liberty of the Exercise of Religion"
Tucked away in the many provisions of these complex treaties is the lan-
guage of religious freedoms inside the realm of each sovereign ruler. Berman
notes: "[T]he non-established religious confessions, whether Protestant or
Roman Catholic, were given the right to assemble and worship as well as the
right to educate their children in their own faith. Thus a principle of religious
toleration was established between Lutherans, Calvinists, and Roman Catho-
lics."94
In The Intellectual History of the Establishment Clause, Noah Feldman
writes of his surprise to find that "there is less in the historical literature
than one might expect when it comes to the origin of the idea of liberty of
conscience."95 I shared that surprise when looking for a scholarly literature
on the religious freedom clauses in the Treaty of Westphalia. Have we missed
examining those clauses in historical context as a source for liberty of con-
science? Do we know fully the "intellectual leap" that influenced negotiations
leading to those exceptions?9
6
The text of the Treaty of Osnabrfick says:
[S]ubjects who in 1627 had been debarred from the free exer-
cise of their religion, other than that of their ruler, were by
the Peace granted the right of conducting private worship,
and of educating their children, at home or abroad, in con-
98 KAPLAN, supra note 3, at 343.
4 BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II, supra note 5, at 61-62.
9 Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346,
355 (2002). "The paucity . . . is surprising because liberty of conscience is such a fundamental
part of modern conceptions of basic rights. It may be that scholars have not gone to great lengths
to find out precisely where the idea of conscience came from because, today, the idea seems so
intuitive." Id.
96 Feldman examines Roger Williams's 1644 book The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution but not any
influence it may have had on these negotiations. Id.
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formity with their own faith; they were not to suffer in any
civil capacity nor to be denied religious burial, but were to be
at liberty to emigrate, selling their estates or leaving them to
be managed by others. 9
The Treaty of Miinster restored the churches and ecclesiastical estates of
those of the Confession of Augsburg as they were in 1624. It guaranteed "the
free Exercise of their Religion, as well in publick Churches at the appointed
Hours, as in private in their own Houses, or in others chosen for this purpose
by their Ministers, or by those of their Neighbours, preaching the Word of
God."98 It incorporated "the Liberty of the Exercise of Religion" in the Treaty
of Osnabriick to serve the general tranquility of the Empire. 99
According to Kaplan, there were three types of "liberty of the exercise of
religion": domestic devotion, public religious services, and private religious
services. 100 In the third category, a cultural fiction developed in public/private
churches as a way to permit toleration for minority sects and Jews. Services
were carried out by clergy "in their own houses or in other houses designated
97 Gross, supra note 82, at 22 (quoting A. W. Ward, The Peace of Westphalia, in 4 THE
CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY 416 (1934)).
98 The English translation of the relevant articles from the Treaty of Miinster reads:
XXVIII. That those of the Confession of Augsburg, and particularly
the Inhabitants of Oppenheim, shall be put in possession again of their
Churches, and Ecclesiastical Estates, as they were in the Year 1624. as also
that all others of the said Confession of Augsburg, who shall demand it, shall
have the free Exercise of their Religion, as well in publick Churches at the
appointed Hours, as in private in their own Houses, or in others chosen for
this purpose by their Ministers, or by those of their Neighbours, preaching
the Word of God.
XLIX. And since for the greater Tranquillity of the Empire, in its
general Assemblys of Peace, a certain Agreement has been made between the
Emperor, Princes and States of the Empire, which has been inserted in the
Instrument and Treaty of Peace, concluded with the Plenipotentiarys of the
Queen and Crown of Swedeland, touching the Differences about
Ecclesiastical Lands, and the Liberty of the Exercise of Religion; it has been
found expedient to confirm, and ratify it by this present Treaty, in the same
manner as the above said Agreement has been made with the said Crown of
Seedeland; also with those call'd the Reformed, in the same manner, as if the
words of the above said Instrument were reported here verbatim.
YALE LAw SCH., THE AVALON PROJECT [hereinafter AVALON PROJECT], available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edul17th century/westphal.asp.
9o Id.
10o 'With this tripartite distinction the diplomats in Westphalia acknowledged that much more
than family prayers went on in private 'houses' . . . describing 'churches' that lacked the external
signs of a church." KAPLAN, supra note 3, at 194.
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for the purpose" and not "in churches at set hours."10 1 Kaplan notes that the
practice "enabled Europeans to accommodate dissent without confronting it
directly, to tolerate knowingly what they could not bring themselves to accept
fully."102
In surveying the main and seemingly endless scholarly literature on the
Religion Clauses in the American Constitution, I have found so far no discus-
sion of the Westphalian provisions granted to protect religious beliefs and
churches and the cultural fictions that suggest an underlying common princi-
ple of freedom of conscience, which dissidents understood from Martin Lu-
ther. Leo Gross's scholarship does refer to some European studies, but I have
not been able to find a scholar who notes the similarity between the precise
use of terms quoted above from the treaty provisions in 1648 and the Religion
Clauses of the American Constitution. To be sure, the best scholarship men-
tions the Protestant Reformation and the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, noting
that control by a sovereign ruler over a single establishment of religion was
also the structure of the Westphalian peace, against which the Americans
were rebelling for their religious freedoms. 103 While the principles of liberty
of religious freedom were being written into the treaty, however, the Puritans
were crossing the Atlantic.
The Reformation, of course, was a uniquely Western development. East-
ern Orthodox Christianity never quite experienced the same kind of internal
disintegration, even after the Islamic conquest of Constantinople in 1453
ended the Byzantine Empire's thousand-year rule. Islam's contending
branches were contained within its empires. Most modern theorists view the
Protestant Reformation structurally as advancing individualism over the
communitarian Middle Ages of Christendom: Western philosophical liberal-
ism, 104 the social contract theories of natural rights,105 and, more controver-
sially, Rights of Man from the Enlightenment. American "exceptionalism,"106
101 Id.
102 Id. at 195.
103 See generally AMAR, supra note 19; LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 92, 101
(1999) [hereinafter LEVY, BILL OF RIGHTS]; Smith, supra note 22; McConnell, supra note 20, at
1468-69; MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA'S TRADITION
OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY (2009).
104 See generally BARUCH DE SPINOZA, TRACTATUS THEOLOGICO-POLITICUS (1670); BARUCH DE
SPINOZA, ETHICS (1670).
105 See generally THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN (1651); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT (1689).
106 SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD 53-76
(1997).
[Vol. 21:721742
RELIGION IN THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA
"the spirit of capitalism,"1 0 7 and "political liberalism" found a source here,
too.' 08 The story is that individualism from the Protestant Reformation and
reason from the Enlightenment tamed violence, channeling it into competi-
tion-political, religious, and economic.
Kaplan's bottom-up study of everyday European life does show religious
tension and often physical conflict among people in their daily lives; yet,
when left alone by the rulers or established churches, people at local levels
everywhere tended to devise many ingenious ways of accommodating their
religious differences in practice.109 Those inner attitudes surely were no dif-
ferent from the liberty of conscience sought by the first settlers in America.
The public order obligation among the political parties was toleration, but the
rulers thought of it as indulgence. And Americans were not to be indulged.1
10
V. ARCHITECTURE OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN PUBLIC ORDER
A. Freedom of Religious Belief and the General Security
The Treaties of Minster and Osnabriuck spelled out public order obliga-
tions. The specific undertaking in Article 123 of the Miinster treaty was that
the peace concluded shall remain in force and that all parties "shall be
obliged to defend and protect all and every article of this peace against any-
one, without distinction of religion."11' Ideas from the Congress of Westpha-
lia, as Leo Gross pointed out, constituted the beginnings of a world structure
of equal and independent sovereign territorial states governed by interna-
107 See generally MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (1905).
108 See generally JOHN RAwLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
109 KAPLAN, supra note 3, at 358.
In the centuries between Reformation and French Revolution, Europeans
discovered that, in practice, they could often manage and contain confessional
conflict. As limited, tension-ridden, and discriminatory as their
accommodations and arrangements were, they can open our eyes to the
unique qualities of the toleration we practice today and the possibility of
other options.
Id.
110 LIPSET, supra note 106, at 20 (noting that "America began and continues as the most anti-
state, legalistic, and rights-oriented nation").
nM AVALON PROJECT, supra note 98. Article CXXIII reads in its entirety:
That nevertheless the concluded Peace shall remain in force, and all Partys
in this Transaction shall be oblig'd to defend and protect all and every Article
of this Peace against any one, without distinction of Religion; and if it
happens any point shall be violated, the Offended shall before all things
exhort the Offender not to come to any Hostility, submitting the Cause to a
friendly Composition, or the ordinary Proceedings of Justice.
Id. art. CXXIII.
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tional law that would include respect and toleration for dissident religious
minorities and freedom to exercise their religious beliefs. 112 Although balanc-
es of power have shifted in Europe and globally, and empires have come and
gone, this framework has continued through the Concert of Europe after the
Napoleonic Wars to the Peace of Versailles and the League of Nations after
the First World War and has survived in the Charter of the United Na-
tions. 113 The Westphalian paradox lies in balancing general security with re-
spect for the liberty of conscience and human dignity.
There were problems. Why should sympathetic and ambitious political
leaders want to stay out of a bordering state, when Catholic or Protestant
minorities (or even radical cults) call on them for protection? If despised reli-
gious minorities may exercise their religious beliefs publicly in their churches
or in private homes within the realm, they might not be compelled to form an
alliance with co-religionists in arms in some other province under control of a
sympathetic and ambitious foreign prince. And the tendency would be to keep
any conflict at a low level-to contain it, even while tolerating disputation. At
least that was the nub of the idea in the treaties. And even when it did not
work out, in the late 17th Century and early 18th Century wars, it remained
a negotiated model for non-intervention principles generally.
This Westphalian system of public order was not only for independent
sovereigns in their external relations. The treaty required the states to inter-
nalize "all and every one of these Articles." 114 It also provided a crude inter-
nationalization of these obligations with protecting powers authorized to
oversee compliance in place of appeals for protection by persecuted religious
sects. The future effect became a general obligation of non-intervention in the
internal affairs of a sovereign state based on religion. It reduced the potential
112 Gross, supra note 82 (arguing that sovereign equality of all members sustains the
establishment of the hegemony of a group of Great Powers as guardians of international peace
and security, a legitimate form of a balance of power based upon the principle of toleration,
which also demanded equality between Protestant and Catholic states and provided some
safeguards for religious minorities).
na Id. at 20.
1 14 AVALON PROJECT, supra note 98, art. CXX.
For the greater Firmness of all and every one of these Articles, this present
Transaction shall serve for a perpetual Law and establish'd Sanction of the
Empire, to be inserted like other fundamental Laws and Constitutions of the
Empire in the Acts of the next Diet of the empire, and the Imperial
Capitulation; binding no less the absent than the present, the Ecclesiasticks
than Seculars, whether they be States of the empire or not: insomuch as that it
shall be a prescrib'd Rule, perpetually to be follow'd, as well by the Imperial
Counsellors and Officers, as those of other Lords, and all Judges and Officers
of Courts of Justice.
Id. (emphasis added).
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for armed conflict with an external enemy who otherwise might have formed
an armed alliance with a religious or dissident minority. The treaties thus
simultaneously recognized crudely the sovereign autonomy of each state sub-
ject to a budding liberty of religious freedom within.
Changing economic conditions beginning in the 16th Century also rein-
forced this strategic compact of public order-but at a price. Ambitions of
sovereigns in centralizing their power were linked with the economic ability
to pay national armies to compete with those financed from Spanish gold and
silver from the Americas under Phillip II. Peter Drucker believes that paying
for war was the principal reason for inventing national sovereignty and ex-
ploiting mercantilism as foreign policy:
The modern state was invented by the French political philos-
opher Jean Bodin in his 1576 book Six Livres de la Re-
publique. He invented the state for one purpose only: to gen-
erate the cash needed to pay the soldiers defending France
against a Spanish army financed by silver from the New
World-the first standing army since the Romans' more than
a thousand years earlier. Mercenaries have to be paid in cash,
and the only way to obtain a large and reliable cash income
over any period-at a time when domestic economies had not
yet been fully monetized and could therefore not yield a per-
manent tax-was a revenue obtained through keeping im-
ports low while pushing exports and subsidizing them.115
And the natural right of property in the self is close to owning one's own
conscience (Locke said as much), permitting monetization of surplus pro-
duced and treating both property and liberty of conscience as inalienable
rights. Ownership of property and liberty of conscience were both part of
Protestant Calvinist doctrines. 116
B. A Sovereign's Dilemma
To restate my initial paradox, why should a sovereign ruler of a realm
tolerate the free exercise of religion within his territory when incompatible
with his established religion? My brief historical review reveals at least three
responses: expediency, individual morality, and the common good of the
community.
Benjamin Kaplan's examination of religious toleration and religious con-
flict in early modern Europe describes expediency through local accommoda-
tion from the ground-up:
11s Peter F. Drucker, Trading Places, 79 NAT'L INT. 101, 105 (2005).
116 See generally WEBER, supra note 107.
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In the centuries between Reformation and French Revolution,
Europeans discovered that, in practice, they could often man-
age and contain confessional conflict. As limited, tension-
ridden, and discriminatory as their accommodations and ar-
rangements were, they can open our eyes to the unique quali-
ties of the toleration we practice today and the possibility of
other options. 117
The free exercise of religion within an established national religion on
this view was an important strategic tool to provide for the general security
by confining religious passions, channeling conflicts to their most local levels,
where inventive religious practices of ordinary people uninterested in
fighting over them might avoid conflict.118
A second explanation is moral: that individual freedom of conscience to
choose a religious belief not coerced by the state is a moral consequence of the
Protestant Reformation, espoused by John Locke in particular as a natural
right a state should not abridge. 119 Max Weber's early 20th Century study
concluded as well that a pervasive Protestant ethic of individualism and tol-
eration released a positive spirit of capitalism and enterprise. That, too, has a
moral quality with religious undertones. Moral belief systems shape cultural
practices, although empirical evidence a century later now questions Weber's
thesis. 120
117 KAPLAN, supra note 3, at 358.
us Roger Williams would allow general and neutral laws to intrude upon the freedom of
conscience when conduct, however pure, would threaten peace and security, suggesting equal
respect for consciences. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 103, at 65-68 (comparing Williams and
Locke).
11 Id. ("Locke speaks in terms of separation of jurisdictions, with exceptions only if generally
applicable and neutral. For him religion and politics don't overlap at all."). For Williams, the
moral overlap is there but is derived from "natural goodness" from within human consciences,
not from religious premises that are coercive. Id. Feldman disagrees with Nussbaum and makes
a rigorous argument from intellectual sources that Locke's liberty of conscience had its roots in
religion and became generally accepted by the time of the Revolution. Feldman, supra note 95, at
384.
0 PIPPA NORRIS & RONALD INGLEHART, SACRED AND SECULAR: RELIGION AND POLITICS
WORLDWIDE 160-62 (2004). The authors point out:
Western societies that were the first to industrialize, have gradually come to
emphasize Postmaterialist values, giving higher priority to the quality of life
than to economic growth. In this respect, the rise of Postmaterialist values
reverses the rise of the Protestant Ethic. Today, the functional equivalent of
the Protestant Ethic is most vigorous in East Asia and is fading away in
Protestant Europe, as technological development and cultural change become
global.
Id. (citing RONALD INGLEHART, MODERNIZATION AND POSTMODERNIZATION ch. 7 (1997)).
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Religious toleration also recites the liberal moral ideals of reason and
rights of man that followed in the Enlightenment. Those who fled persecution
in Europe (the Puritan migration began while the religious wars were in full
sway) as well as others brought with them to America a moral American "ex-
ceptionalism" from religious sects having to compete for salvation in a vast
new world. The political theorist John Rawls found important roots of liberal
society in "the long controversies over religious toleration in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries . .. [when] something like the modern understand-
ing of liberty of conscience and freedom of thought began."121 Because of this
moral inheritance, it is often observed, the United States has never experi-
enced religious wars like those in Europe. 122
A third justification of toleration reaches back into medieval Christendom
and to ancient Greek and Roman civilizations. Thomas Aquinas and Arab
scholars reconciled reason and faith, Aristotle and Augustine, and the com-
munity's common good with the "natural rights" of individuals. The common
good requires human dignity and freedom. It cannot flourish outside a com-
munity where individual duty entails cooperation and submission. The idea
of a sovereign self was a medieval theological concept. It did not, as most as-
sume, originate with the Western Reformation or Enlightenment, when mod-
ern natural rights theories presumed property in the self, as Locke's Letter
on Toleration and his Treatise develop. The social contract and the rights of
man, including Locke's liberty of conscience, must have pulled on these long-
er roots submerged within the medieval corpus christi of Christendom.123
Theologically, a sacred conscious self is located there, with a first duty to God
through the church for the benefit of the community of God.124 Luther's pro-
test is in that tradition, his duty to God in light of conscience is almost Stoic.
Madison's presupposition in the Memorial and Remonstrance is an '"inner
church' of conscience" whereby "[t]he Religion . . . of every man must be left to
the conviction and conscience of every man."125 Steven Smith locates this in-
121 RAWLS, supra note 108, at xxvi.
122 ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E. CAMPBELL, AMERICAN GRACE: How RELIGION DIVIDES AND
UNITES Us 549-50 (2010).
123 Martha Nussbaum argues for a shared moral overlap such as the Roberts Court unanimously
finds in the Religion Clauses requiring special solicitude for church religious freedoms of inner
governance. NUSSBAUM, supra note 103, at 67-68. We catch glimpses of this view in the special
spiritual jurisdiction of the church in the Papal Revolution.
124 See BRIAN TIERNEY, Religious Rights: A Historical Perspective, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN
WESTERN THOUGHT 29, 43-44 (1996); BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS: STUDIES
ON NATURAL RIGHTS, NATURAL LAW, AND CHURCH LAW 1150-1625 (1997); RICHARD TUCK,
NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES: THEIR ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT (1979).
125 Smith, supra note 22, at 33 (quoting JAMES MADISON, A MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE
AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1785)); cf. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT (AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL
GOVERNMENT) AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 123, 129 (rev. ed. 1976) (asserting that
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ner church in the unifying idea of subsidiarity and the conciliar movement
from the Church in the Middle Ages.126 These powerful ideas survive today in
the secular idea of "inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of
all members of the human family"-expressed in the preamble to the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights-whose duty, ironically, is not to God first,
but to the community "in which alone the free and full development of his
personality is possible."127
VI. PROTESTANTS FROM EUROPE TRANSPLANTED IN AMERICA
A. The Intolerant City on the Hill
In the American colonies in 1640, well before the exhausting Christian
wars of religion came to an end in the Peace of Westphalia, Puritan Governor
John Winthrop of the Massachusetts Bay Colony referred to his new settle-
ment as a city on a hill. It was not a tolerant city. Ten years earlier, these
Puritans (to be distinguished from the Pilgrims-religious separatists-who
settled in Plymouth) fled religious persecution they encountered in the Eng-
lish Reformation. They were Calvinists, who wanted to purify, not separate
from, the Church of England.128 While the original Massachusetts Bay Com-
pany was chartered for economic profit, the colony soon became a Calvinist
theocracy (like Calvin himself established in Geneva) under Winthrop, who
wanted to build "a holy community in America [to] serve as an example and
so redeem England" with this "errand into the wilderness."129
The Puritans promised
to obey their heavenly king in return for His blessings in a
Promised Land. Such positive freedom meant to escape the
slavery of sin born of one's own corrupt soul and thus be at
liberty to do what was right-the exact opposite of a libertari-
an's negative freedom from external constraints.s 0
"true and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind, without which nothing
can be acceptable to God . . . [and] it cannot be compelled to the belief of anything by outward
force").
126 BRIAN TIERNEY, FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONCILIAR THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE
MEDIEVAL CANONISTS FROM GRATIAN TO THE GREAT SCHISM (1955).
127 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), pmbl.
art. 29(1) (Dec. 10, 1948).
128 ZAGORIN, supra note 2 at 190-91.
129 WALTER A. MCDOUGALL, FREEDOM JUST AROUND THE CORNER: A NEW AMERICAN HISTORY:
1585-1828, 57(2004).
130 Id. at 59.
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A few years later, Captain John Mason led men from the new colony in a sur-
prise attack on a Pequot Indian village to avenge savage murders and pre-
vent further hostilities by the tribe. 131 William Bradford, an early settler, de-
scribed the massacre:
Those that escaped the fire were slain with the sword, some
hewed to pieces, others run through with their rapiers, so as
they were quickly dispatched and very few escaped. It was
conceived that they thus destroyed about 400 at this time. It
was a fearful sight to see them thus frying in the fire and the
streams of blood quenching the same, and horrible was the
stink and scent thereof; but the victory seemed a sweet sacri-
fice, and they gave the praise thereof to God, who had
wrought so wonderfully for them, thus to enclose their ene-
mies in their hands and give them so speedy a victory over so
proud and insulting an enemy. 132
So began the American experience with religion, government, and enter-
prise in New England. The Puritans and other sects thought God had given
them a new Zion exceptionally, theirs to claim by right later to win political
independence from Europe, to assume free and equal status among nations of
the world. 133 "Puritans no more believed in democracy than did the Stuarts . .
"134
Winthrop banished Roger Williams from the colony in 1635 for insisting
that the "colony's churches should make a complete and open separation from
the impure and anti-Christian Anglican Church." 135 After founding
Providence and Rhode Island on separatist principles grounded in freedom of
conscience, he travelled to England to publish in 1644 his great work, The
Bloudy Tenent, which advanced the "fundamental thesis that Christ had
ordained a complete distinction between the civil-political and the religious-
spiritual domains, and hence that the magistrate was excluded from all
power over the church and religion." 36 He was challenging John Cotton's
defense of religious persecution justifying banishment.
Though difficult to determine where Williams's ideas originated, they
faintly echo those both from the Papal Revolution and from the Protestant
131 See EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, ROGER WILLIAMS (LIVES AND LEGACIES) ch. 2 (2005).
132 Howard Zinn, The Power and The Glory: Myths of American Exceptionality, BOSTON REVIEW,
Summer 2005, bostonreview.net/BR30.3/zinn.php.
133 See generally LOUIs HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955).
134 MCDOUGALL, supra note 129, at 58.
135 ZAGORIN, supra note 2, at 198.
136 Id. at 199-200 ("It is difficult to determine the sources of his ideas.").
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Reformation because civil power profanes religion, while the sacred employs
the civil power coercively. Each person's conscience seeks light in a dark wil-
derness in the journey of life. "To impose an orthodoxy upon the conscience is
nothing less . . . than 'Soule rape."'137 Williams's work was published in Lon-
don just as the Congress of Westphalia gathered, well before John Locke's
letter on toleration and a century and a half before Madison's remonstrance.
Its influence is clear for Locke and Madison. How likely was it that those who
were negotiating the Westphalian peace also knew of Williams's book?
B. The Protestants of Protestantism
At the time of the American Revolution, Edmund Burke saw in sectarian
Americans such as these Puritans the "Protestants of Protestantism, the Dis-
senters of Dissent which predisposed them to moralism and individual-
ism." 1 38 Max Weber later confirmed that the spirit of capitalism was present
from the beginning in the strong religious beliefs of the Puritans and the
Protestant Reformation. 139 Even secular liberalism in Europe and the United
States has religious roots in the Protestant Establishment. 140 Such a cultural
predisposition might seem as unifying as Catholic Christendom was in pre-
Reformation Europe. 141
Nevertheless, Bernard Bailyn shows how widespread were the uncoordi-
nated attacks on establishments of religion. 142 They magnified a sense of par-
anoia, convinced of a secret conspiracy to establish an American episcopate,
"an ecclesiastical conspiracy against American liberties latent among noncon-
formists through all of colonial history." 143 These all came together, "mingling
137 NUSSBAUM, supra note 103, at 37. For Williams's work and its relationship to John Locke's,
see generally id. at 34-71.
138 LIPSET, supra note 106, at 60 (citing Burke's speech to the House of Commons, proposing
reconciliation with the Colonies). Anne Hutchinson challenged the whole framework of Puritan
piety of the "elect" as early as 1635; she protested the Puritan protest. MACCULLOCH,
REFORMATION, supra note 51, at 521.
139 See generally WEBER, supra note 107.
140 See BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II, supra note 5, at 258 (discussing the return of spiritual
jurisdiction from the pope to the kings).
141 See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause,
100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 369 (2001) (noting that the origins of the modern Establishment Clause
lay not in 18th Century resistance to Anglican establishments, but in 19th and 20th Century
Protestant Establishment of public common schools that read the King James Bible and viewed
support for religious schools as subtext for tax support of Catholic parochial schools, which soon
began to crumble like Christendom did post-Protestant Reformation in 16th Century Europe).
142 See generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
246-72, 96-97 (1992).
143 Id. at 96-97.
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sectarianism and secular reform, that would result, ultimately, in the dises-
tablishment of religion in the states and in the United States of America." 144
C. Sovereignty of States after Revolution
By the time of the American Revolution, the Peace of Westphalia of 1648
had become the new order of sovereign territorial states in Europe, separat-
ing secular power from any unifying religion. In America, sovereignty of the
newly independent states occurred within that framework through the Decla-
ration of Independence and Revolution. "[F]issiparous tendencies well known
from the first days of the Reformation became a general feature of American
religious life. Toleration accommodated difference, but it also produced
among the different groups a pattern of accommodation to the Protestant
model that made coexistence easier than it might have been."145
Thomas Jefferson dealt directly with the state sovereignty question in the
Declaration of Independence by invoking a "decent respect for the opinions of
mankind" to justify the dissolution of the political "bands" connecting the col-
onies to Great Britain. 146 The abuse of self-evident axioms of inalienable hu-
man rights that would include religious freedom justified the colonies in
breaking away to "assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and
equal station" to which they were entitled.147 These were the structural pre-
suppositions of territorial sovereignty and equality of the Westphalian sys-
tem of states. Each newly independent state in the federal alliance thus ac-
quired the capacity to establish or disestablish state religion. Popular sover-
eignty meant consent of the majority, a social contract to establish govern-
ment, and freedom of individual conscience in religious belief and practice
locally, within each sovereign state.
The founding generation saw firsthand that religious unity would not and
could not work in America. There were far too many robust sects with minis-
ters competing for members in different colonies.148 The federal union they
created after the Revolution was clearly disestablishment at the national lev-
el. No central legislative power pertaining to religion would be delegated to
the federal government in the new constitution. That did not mean the found-
ing was anti-religion. Historian Walter McDougall explains:
144 Id. at 251.
145 WALZER, supra note 23, at 67-68.
146 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
17Id.
14 WALZER, supra note 23, at 247-72. Except for anti-establishment Pennsylvania, "the pattern
of establishments, like that of so many other areas of life in the colonies, was the result of
unsystematic, incomplete, pragmatic modification of a traditional model." BAILYN, supra note
142, at 247-48.
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The reason was not that they were enlightened secularists
who thought faith unimportant. On the contrary, a large ma-
jority of the Framers were confessing Christians and church
officers, while even skeptics repeatedly named faith and mor-
als indispensable props for self-government. But Americans
were a people of many denominations; to favor or punish one
or another was sure to imperil the Union. So the Framers said
nothing about religion because it was just too important; the
only solution lay in forbidding federal restrictions on free ex-
ercise of religion and leaving it up to states to decide whether
to have local religious establishments. Madison even endorsed
religious liberty as the best means to promote sincere faith in
people, and of course almost all the Framers agreed ... that
civil and religious liberty leaned on each other. 149
In the previous century, the European solution in the Peace of Westpha-
lia was to separate political rule from the Roman Catholic religion of the Holy
Roman Empire as a condition of peace. Each ruler or state was sovereign and
free from an imposed religion but could have his or its own religious estab-
lishment, a structure that placed the state religion under the sovereign sub-
ject to certain religious freedoms for those not of a ruler's faith. 150
The American solution left the religion issue to be decided locally with
the states, not with national government. When contemporary scholars ex-
plore Protestant analogues for this local structure, they tend to discuss only
the general terms of the Peace of Augsburg of 1555. Akhil Amar, for example,
writes that the original American establishment clause "simply calls for the
issue to be decided locally (in this respect it is the American equivalent of the
European Peace of Augsburg in 1555 and Treaty of Westphalia in 1648,
which decreed that religious policy would be set locally rather than imperial-
ly)."1 51 While that is true, Amar leaves out the Westphalian provision for lo-
cal freedom of religion. Levy similarly cites the European experience with a
single established church following the Protestant Reformation, without
mentioning the Westphalian structure of limited liberty for free exercise of
religion by dissidents. 152 Martha Nussbaum credits the Treaty of Westphalia
only with ending "the century's bloody wars of religion, but in a way that was
not reassuring to religious minorities [because the] treaty's stated principle . .
. (whoever's region it is, his shall the religion be), allowed local rulers to es-
1
4 9 
McDOUGALL, supra note 129, at 312.
150 See BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II, supra note 5.
151 AMAR, supra note 19, at 34.
152 LEVY, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 103, at 101.
752 [Vol. 21:721
RELIGION iN THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA
tablish a chosen religion in each domain, persecuting internal dissidents."1 5 3
She does not address the treaty provisions for protecting the religious free-
dom of these dissidents.
Steven Smith also makes no mention of these treaty provisions when
proposing a medieval inner "self' as a source for recognizing an inner freedom
of the church under the Religion Clauses of the American Constitution. This
inner "self' would create a jurisdictional immunity for the freedom of church
and of conscience independent of the state. His imaginative essay distin-
guishing "freedom of the church" from "freedom of religion" seems to revive a
political agenda of the papal party at the time of the Papal Revolution. 154
Smith uses this papal party argument by way of an analogy of treating
churches as foreign embassies. However, that extraterritorial fiction 155 is not
likely to get very far, especially considering Roberts's footnote four in Hosan-
na-Tabor that rejects treating the ministerial exemption as a jurisdictional
immunity.
D. The Structure of the Westphalian Peace
The structure of the Westphalian Peace was far more complex for federal
republics such as the United States than it was for sovereign European na-
tion-states. Analytically, there are three levels of effective power over religion
to compare.
The first level is in the cultural unity of Western Christendom that the
pope and Holy Roman Empire imposed on subsidiary provinces and monar-
chies. When this unity broke up in the Protestant Revolution, each subsidiary
entity or state separated from the single Catholic unity, and the established
religion became that of the local ruler; negotiated in Augsburg and continued
in the Westphalian structure to keep the peace. Loosely led by France and
Sweden, the parties to the treaties became the new first level of power, over-
seeing compliance with the terms of the agreements.
153 NUSSBAUM, supra note 103, at 35.
154 Smith, supra note 22, at 30.
155 See KAPLAN, supra note 3, at 187-188. The extraterritorial concept was a fiction taken from
claiming chapels of foreign embassies as private places of Catholic worship as if not on the host
country's territory. Nevertheless,
neither court rulings nor treaty stipulations nor established legal principles
lent protection to embassy chapels at the time of their proliferation.
Extraterritoriality was an ex post facto justification, developed in no small
part to rationalize the already established practice of tolerating embassy
chapels. Indeed, the embassy chapel question was "the largest single factor in
preparing men's minds to accept this extraordinary fiction."
Id. (quoting GARRETT MATTINGLY, RENAISSANCE DIPLOMAcY 272, 280-281 (1971)).
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Each sovereign state, now freed from an imposed Catholic unity became
the second level power and could choose to remain Catholic or convert to a
Protestant sect. It could collect taxes to pay its own clergy or to build its
churches without interference from pope or emperor.
The third or lowest level of power gave religious dissidents the freedom to
practice their own religion within the realm of the sovereign's church. It is
this third level that distinguishes the structure of Westphalia from that of
the Peace of Augsburg, which did not provide any protection of religious free-
dom or church other than that of the established religion in the sovereign ter-
ritory. Under the Peace of Westphalia, Lutherans, Calvinists, and Catholics
were given rights, and other dissident sects and Jews were accommodated by
a cultural fiction. 156 They would not have to convert or leave, as heretics
would under the Peace of Augsburg. Any worship in private or in a dissident
church that was tolerated under the Augsburg peace was a ruler's indul-
gence, but under the terms of the Westphalian Peace it was a matter of a lim-
ited right.
Even in England, where the Westphalian rights of religious freedom were
not law, Parliament on its own was enacting protections for religious liber-
ties. Commenting on the Toleration Act of 1689 then before Parliament, John
Locke wrote to a Dutch friend:
In Parliament the subject of toleration is now discussed under
two forms, "comprehension" and "indulgence." By the first it
is proposed to enlarge the bounds of the church so that by the
abolition of some ceremonies, many [people] may be induced
to conform. By the other is designed [sic] the toleration of
those who are either unwilling or unable to unite with the
Church of England, even on the proposed conditions. 157
The first enlarged the church tent to attract a variety of different beliefs to
membership in a single church. The second accepted the existence of multiple
churches in tents of their own.
VII. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM INTO THE FUTURE
A. Locating Hosanna-Tabor in Historical Structure
In the United States Constitution, the first or highest structural level is
in the federal government's lack of power to affect religion one way or anoth-
er, reinforced by the "Congress shall make no law" clause of the First
156 See KAPLAN, supra note 3, at 195.
157 AMAR, supra note 19, at 132-33 (quoting MAURICE CRANSTON, JOHN LOCKE: A BIOGRAPHY 314
(1957)).
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Amendment. As in the Westphalian treaties, the second and third levels of
power and freedom are local, as Amar points out.15o The apt historical analo-
gy from the treaties of Westphalia lies in disabling the emperor's coercive
power (like Congress's disability) over a local ruler's own religion (like a
state's establishment) within the loosely federal Holy Roman Empire (like the
U. S. federal union).
Since each state of the federal union had power, analogous to that of a
European sovereign, to establish an official Christian church, the state might
also, according to Leonard Levy, "indulge" religious dissidents or coerce them
to join or support an established church by taxes. 15 8 A number of newly inde-
pendent American states chose to have multiple establishments supporting
various sects through taxes or even compulsory attendance before the Consti-
tution was framed. Only a few years earlier in 1784, Madison's argument
against an Assessment Bill to support religious education in Virginia oc-
curred at this second level. 15 9 The focus of that debate, the coercion of reli-
gious conscience, introduced popular sovereignty, a problem for Madison. A
popular Anglican majority in place of the King of England might coerce the
payment of taxes from dissidents in other sects and even require compulsory
attendance.
While "[t]he American experience with establishments of religion was
unknown to eighteenth-century Europe," the six states that did maintain es-
tablishments at the time the Bill of Rights was drafted "had multiple or gen-
eral establishments of religion."16 0 That had come to mean mainly govern-
ment financial support for religion generally without preference to any
church. 161
The power of post-Revolution American states regarding the establish-
ment of a state religion, however, is comparable to that of post-Reformation
European states only within the structure of the Peace of Augsburg, where a
ruler has absolute choice. It is true that the Peace of Westphalia continued
the choice in Europe, but it was no longer absolute. Treaty provisions con-
taining the words "free exercise of their religion" first appear in writing to
limit the sovereign's power. While dissidents might have been "indulged" in
practice in Europe (and in the European-type establishments a few American
states chose), the freedom of Americans to worship or not, as their conscienc-
es chose, reflected more of the spirit of the Westphalian provisions than the
stricter Augsburg structure of convert or leave.
158 LEVY, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 103, at 90.
159 JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1785).
160 LEVY, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 103, at 92.
161 Id
Winter 2013] 755
TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Religious freedom in America is exercised by right at the third structural
level, at the locus of free exercise rights similar to those granted to Luther-
ans, Calvinists, and reformed sects in the Peace of Westphalia, not only as
limits on the sovereign monarchs but also as positive freedoms. If the Virgin-
ia House of Burgesses (at the second structural level) had chosen to collect
taxes to benefit the Anglican Church and some others as well, the measure
would have violated the individual's inalienable liberty of conscience, as Mad-
ison argued. The dominant majority would be limited by preexisting "natural
rights" (perhaps recognized in a state's Bill of Rights).
Originally, the national government at the highest structural level would
have had no power to interfere with Virginia's choice at that secondary level.
After the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the First Amendment as
against the states, however, neither the states nor the national government
could abridge either the Free Exercise Clause or, to some extent, the anoma-
lous clause respecting an establishment of religion. Nor, after Hosanna-
Tabor, can they interfere today with internal ecclesiastical appointments in-
side any sect.162 These third-level spheres of positive church freedom, at the
lowest structural level, would include rabbinical or Islamic appointments, as
well as those in Hindu or Buddhist groups and, arguably, new age reli-
gions. 1 63
James Madison's argument in the Virginia House of Burgesses brought
him face-to-face with popular sovereignty. 164 The question in a republic, Mad-
ison understood, was that dissidents needed protection from a potentially co-
ercive democratic majority voting to impose values from the dominant reli-
gious or other culture. Madison's first draft of the Bill of Rights later intro-
duced in Congress would have limited the states as well as the federal gov-
ernment, but drafting changes reintroduced the idea that the national gov-
ernment would have no power concerning religion. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment changed that structure. It gave explicit authority to Congress to enforce
its provisions that now included what Madison originally had proposed as a
limitation in the Bill of Rights. But that enforcement power now also carried
with it a danger that a Congressional majority would have power it did not
have originally to impose on a religious minority the religious or secular val-
ues of the dominant national culture. Hence, the Supreme Court has as-
162 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, No. 10-553, slip op. at
1-2 (Jan. 11, 2012) (Alito, S., dissenting) (arguing that the ministerial exception applies
functionally for all religious groups such as Catholics, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, or Buddhists, not
just Protestant denominations, since "virtually every religion in the world is represented in the
population of the United States").
163 Id.
164 JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 312-16 (1996).
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sumed additional national judicial powers at the first or highest structural
level, as guardian of the religious minority against a dominant majority. It is
at this point in structural evolution that Hossana-Tabor v. EEOC should be
understood best.
Roberts's opinion thus recognizes a category for protecting positive
church freedoms against a popular majority from both the national Congress
and the states, whose laws-though valid, neutral, and generally applica-
ble-intrude upon these positive religious freedoms:
Seeking to escape the control of the national church, the Puri-
tans fled to New England, where they hoped to elect their own
ministers and establish their own modes of worship... . Colo-
nists in the South, in contrast, brought the Church of Eng-
land with them. But even they sometimes chafed at the con-
trol exercised by the Crown and its representatives over reli-
gious offices. . .. It was against this background that the First
Amendment was adopted. Familiar with life under the estab-
lished Church of England, the founding generation sought to
foreclose the possibility of a national church. . . . By forbid-
ding the "establishment of religion" and guaranteeing the
"free exercise thereof," the Religion Clauses ensured that the
new Federal Government-unlike the English Crown-would
have no role in filling ecclesiastical offices. The Establishment
Clause prevents the Government from appointing ministers,
and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering
with the freedom of religious groups to select their own. 165
The opinion also makes clear in footnote four that the ministerial excep-
tion to generally applicable legislation is an affirmative defense to a law suit
alleging employment discrimination, not a question of power to hear the case,
though the main text seems to leave the question open:
We conclude that the exception operates as an affirmative de-
fense to an otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional
bar. That is because the issue presented by the exception is
"whether the allegations the plaintiff makes entitle him to re-
lief," not whether the court has "power to hear [the] case."166
To summarize, this case mirrors the tension between the church and sec-
ular rulers when power over inner ecclesiastical appointments first shifted
from the kings to the Pope after the Papal Revolution, then shifted back to
sovereign rulers during the Protestant Revolution. The Court asserts su-
165 Hosanna-Tabor, No. 10-553, slip op. at 7-8.
166 Id. at 20 n.4.
Winter 2013] 757
TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
preme judicial power at the highest level of both the Augsburg and Westpha-
lia structures when it defines the boundaries between church and state at all
levels. The opinion seems also to suggest a sphere of special solicitude for
church autonomy beyond ecclesiastical appointments that may need judicial
protection and supervision given the American multiplicity of sects and reli-
gious organizations that stand in contrast to European traditions. 167
B. Special Solicitude for Church Freedom of Conscience
In Hosanna-Tabor, the EEOC and Administration argued that the First
Amendment freedom of association is adequate to protect the churches' free-
dom in employment discrimination disputes on a basis of equality with the
secular freedom of association under the privacy theory of the Jaycees case. 168
Chief Justice Roberts dismissed that argument as untenable: "That result is
hard to square with the text of the First Amendment itself, which gives spe-
cial solicitude to the rights of religious organizations. We cannot accept the
remarkable view that the Religion Clauses have nothing to say about a reli-
gious organization's freedom to select its own ministers."16 9
How far should this special solicitude be extended in the future? Assum-
ing the validity of a generally applicable law, do the Religion Clauses prohibit
a positive federal mandate to require religious organizations to provide em-
ployee benefits that conflict with church doctrine on matters of conscience?
The American Catholic bishops, for example, oppose as violating church free-
dom of religion any generally applicable regulations requiring church schools,
hospitals, and social services agencies to carry employee health insurance
benefits with birth control and sterilization coverage in conflict with church
doctrine. 170 Now that the Court has upheld the validity of the Affordable
167 See LEVY, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 103, at 101-02; see also LEONARD W. LEVY, THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 5-11 (2d ed. 1994).
168 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 622 (1984).
169 Hosanna-Tabor, No. 10-553, slip op. at 14.
170 See Ross Douthat, Government and Its Rivals, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/29/opinion/sunday/douthat-government-and-its-rivals.html?
ref=opinion (a reader responds: "If people choose to be part of the Catholic church and to follow
'its teachings about condoms and birth control, that is their right. But the Church does not have
the right to force the general public to accept these teachings by denying people medical services
protected by law and accepted by the vast, vast majority of the population (including most
Catholics)"). See also Denise Grady, Ruling on Conception Draws Battle Lines in Catholic
College, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/30/health/policy/law-fuels-
contraception-controversy-on-catholic-campuses.html? r=1hpw; Peter Berger, Contraception and
the Culture War, AM. INTEREST (Feb. 22, 2012), http://blogs.the-american-
interest.com/berger/2012/02/22/contraception-and-the-culture-war/.
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Health Care Act under the taxing power,171 would such regulations abridge
the Church's liberty of conscience under the Religion Clauses? 172
If no accommodation can be reached and the issue comes before the Su-
preme Court, might a historical connection to the Peace of Westphalia provi-
sions on free exercise of religion be of any relevance? These issues of conflict
between church and state persist, as shown by our fascination with Thomas
Becket during the Papal Revolution and with Sir Thomas More during the
Reformation. By historical analogy, we might view special solicitude as a re-
turn to the medieval immunity of the sovereign church and its functions from
the jurisdiction of kings in their temporal realms. Might the liberty of religion
exceptions in the treaty be precedent for an independent sphere of inner free-
dom of church?
So far, the Court has applied the Religion Clauses narrowly. Perhaps any
special solicitude for churches found in the treaties that ended the religious
wars at a time when the first settlers were coming to America from Europe
will take hold for argument. Steven Smith has pointed out the problem with
justifying special solicitude for religious freedom.173 He has a better solution:
"Various authors have described the evolution of this commitment following
the Protestant Reformation and in the early American Republic. For our pur-
poses, the key point is that freedom of conscience extended, and adopted the
theological and jurisdictional logic of, freedom of the church." 174 And that
theological and jurisdictional logic, in his view, follows from the medieval
Gregorian Revolution.175
Defining "religion" is implicated as well in any special solicitude for
churches, for liberty of conscience does not need a hierarchy or ministers or
171 See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. _ , 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
172 See BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 100-33 (2013) (arguing that selective
application of the liberty of religious conscience itself for a special exemption to an otherwise
valid and neutral law promoting the general welfare is not morally defensible). Also to be
considered is Emp't Div., Dep't. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (upholding denial of
unemployment benefits when fired for ingesting peyote, a crime under Oregon law, though used
for sacramental purposes, because the "right of free exercise of religion does not relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or
proscribes)"). The Court distinguished Smith from Hosanna-Tabor, a suit for retaliation for
dismissal of a teacher with ministerial duties. Hosanna-Tabor amounted to "government
interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church
itself," where Smith affects only external conduct of an employee.
173 Steven D. Smith, The Pluralist Predicament: Contemporary Theorizing in the Law of Religious
Freedom, 10 LEGAL THEORY 51 (2004) (explaining that why the free exercise of religion deserves
special constitutional protection is a hard question, for which theorists have thus far furnished
no very compelling answer).
174 See Smith, supra note 22.
175 See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
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teachers to sustain it. Michael McConnell, however, maintains that the fram-
ers of the First Amendment's language chose to use the words "free exercise
of religion" instead of "liberty of conscience" alongside "respecting an estab-
lishment" to avoid treating a secular conscience with the same respect as a
religious conscience. He argues that the words "free exercise of religion" were
used for the first time in drafting the First Amendment to reflect that inten-
tion.176 But we now know that similar words first appeared in the Westphali-
an Peace Treaty of 1648 as an exemption from compelling worship at an es-
tablished church.
Yet to be explored is whether there is any link between the great medie-
val thinkers who created a separate spiritual jurisdiction for an inner church
of conscience and the philosophers and theologians who assembled in the
Congress of Westphalia and might have suggested ideas and words to pre-
serve that heritage in the treaties.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Historical circumstances surrounding the end of the Thirty Years' War in
Europe tell an often forgotten lesson for understanding why the merger of an
organized church and a state with a monopoly of coercive power threatens the
general security at any structural level. For most of human history, religious
and secular powers have collaborated to govern human affairs directly and
indirectly. Only recently has separation proved the better path-within the
last 300 years. "The point of separating church and state in the modern re-
gimes is to deny political power to all religious authorities, on the realistic
assumption that all of them are at least potentially intolerant."177
To impose secular values on religious consciences with deep roots in hu-
man experience also repeats religious intolerance. 178 The American experi-
ence that began with migrations during the Protestant Reformation in Eu-
rope in part for reasons of liberty of conscience now includes a multiplicity of
sects, churches, and individual or group beliefs and non-beliefs, all protected,
we think, by the Religion Clauses in the Constitution. A saying of Berdyaev,
the Russian mystic, quoted by Charles Taylor, reminds us that the secular
may be sacred, too: "Knowledge, morality, art, government and the economy
176 McConnell, supra note 20, at 1468-69; but see Feldman, supra note 95, at 426 ("[B]roaden
conscience to include secular matters of deep belief, and the Lockean distinction between the
sphere of the church and that of the state evaporates.").
177 WALZER, supra note 23, at 81.
us See generally CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 503-35 (2007).
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should become religious, but freely and from inside, not by compulsion from
outside." 179
A fresh look at the Peace of Westphalia brings the idea of "liberty of free
exercise of religion" or the liberty of conscience into another new era, "just at
the beginning of a new age of religious searching, whose outcome no one can
foresee." 80
Liberty of conscience is an ode to the life-long work of Burns Weston.
Long ago he knew how obsolete the Westphalian public order system had be-
come in coping with our contemporary global problems, whether they be nu-
clear weaponry, ecological change, free market global capitalism, or interna-
tional peace and security. He has worked on every one of these major prob-
lems. We are now seeing the emergence of overlapping forms of global public
order systems, including structures of global neo-feudalism and communal
forms of subsidiarity. Still, we must not forget the lessons about intolerance
and the general security that we have learned from the religious and ideolog-
ical wars of the past five hundred years.
179 Id. at 535
1so Id.
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